We present a model of an economy with heterogeneous banks that may be funded with uninsured deposits and equity capital. Capital serves to ameliorate a moral hazard problem in the choice of risk. There is a fixed aggregate supply of bank capital, so the cost of capital is endogenous. A regulator sets risk-sensitive capital requirements in order to maximize a social welfare function that incorporates a social cost of bank failure. We consider the effect of a negative shock to the supply of bank capital and show that optimal capital requirements should be lowered. Failure to do so would keep banks safer but produce a large reduction in aggregate investment. The result provides a rationale for the cyclical adjustment of risk-sensitive capital requirements.
Introduction
Discussions on the potential business cycle ampli…cation e¤ects of Basel II started long before its approval in 2004 by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2004) . The argument whereby these e¤ects may occur is well-known. In recessions, losses erode banks' capital, while risk-sensitive capital requirements such as those in Basel II become higher. If banks cannot quickly raise su¢ cient new capital, they will be forced to reduce their lending, thereby contributing to the worsening of the downturn. However, a reduction in capital requirements makes banks riskier, so there is a trade-o¤.
The purpose of this paper is to construct a simple model of optimal capital regulation that illustrates this trade-o¤. The model has a continuum of banks that di¤er in an observable characteristic (their "risk type") that is related to their incentives to take risk. Banks may fund their investments with uninsured deposits and equity capital. There is a moral hazard problem in the choice of risk that implies ine¢ cient risk-shifting under debt …nance, which capital serves to ameliorate. A regulator sets risk-sensitive capital requirements in order to maximize a social welfare function that incorporates a social cost of bank failure. This yields a capital charge curve that is increasing in the banks' risk type. We consider a short-run situation (or one with severe capital market frictions) in which bank capital is exogenously …xed, and study the e¤ects of a negative shock to the aggregate supply of bank capital. 1 We show that the optimal response to the shock is to lower capital requirements. Failure to do so would keep banks safer but produce a large reduction in aggregate investment. The result provides a rationale for the cyclical adjustment of risk-sensitive capital requirements.
The paper is closely related to Kashyap and Stein (2004) . They present a framework (which is developed in the longer working paper version of their article) in which there is a regulator that cares about bank lending as well as the social cost of bank failure. They conclude that "instead of there being a single once-and-for-all curve that maps risk measures into capital charges, optimality requires a family of point-in-time curves, with each curve corresponding to (...) di¤erent macroeconomic conditions." In their model there is a representative bank that maximizes the expected return of a portfolio of di¤erent types of risky loans. There is also a regulator that maximizes the expected return of the bank's portfolio minus a reduced-form term that captures the social cost of bank failure. The regulator chooses capital requirements for each type of loan in order to maximize its objective function subject to a capital availability constraint. The shadow value of bank capital is the Lagrange multiplier associated to this constraint. They conclude that when bank capital is scarce, its shadow value will be high, and the regulator should lower capital requirements.
Although their intuition is the same as ours, the models are very di¤erent. Kashyap and Stein do not consider the e¤ect of limited liability, ignoring that the convexity of the bank's objective function implies that it would want to specialize in only one type of loans (see Repullo and Suarez, 2004) . They also take as exogenous the risk-adjusted discount rate for each type of loan, a variable that should in principle depend on the (endogenous) capital requirement for each type of loan. Finally, they model in a reduced-form manner the e¤ect of capital on the probability of bank failure.
In contrast, our approach does not su¤er from these shortcomings. Building on Repullo (2005) , in our model a continuum of banks with di¤erent risk types have an investment opportunity of size one that may be funded by risk-neutral depositors and outside equity investors. There is an in…nitely elastic supply of uninsured deposits at an expected return that is normalized to zero and a …xed aggregate supply of bank capital, so the cost of capital is endogenously determined in equilibrium. After raising the required funds, each bank chooses a risk parameter that, together with its type, determines its probability of failure.
The bank's choice of risk is not observed by depositors, so there is a (risk-shifting) moral hazard problem.
We …rst characterize the equilibrium of the model in the absence of regulation. Interestingly, banks will in general want to have capital in order to ameliorate the moral hazard problem. The trade-o¤ is that capital helps on the moral hazard front, but it is in general more expensive than deposits. In fact, when the cost of capital equals the return required by depositors there is no trade-o¤, and banks would only be funded with equity.
We then introduce a risk-neutral regulator that faces the same informational constraints as the market, in particular the inability to observe the banks'choice of risk. For this reason, the regulator resorts to using capital requirements to indirectly in ‡uence banks'risk-taking.
Unlike in the Basel II regulation, which is based on targeting an exogenous probability of failure for all banks, here the regulator maximizes society's welfare subject to the capital availability constraint. The social welfare function incorporates a term that captures the negative externalities associated with bank failures. Of course, if bank failures entailed no social cost, the market equilibrium would be e¢ cient, and bank capital regulation would not be justi…ed. In contrast, when there is a social cost of bank failure, the regulator requires banks to have more capital than they would choose in the absence of regulation. But there is a trade-o¤: although banks will be safer, aggregate investment will be lower. We show that the optimal regulation may be implemented as a risk-based schedule of minimum capital requirements, with banks of riskier types facing higher capital requirements.
Finally, we consider the e¤ect of a negative shock to the aggregate supply of bank capital, which could be interpreted as the result of a downturn of the economy that produces losses that erode banks'capital. Obviously, our modelling approach implicitly assumes the existence of capital market imperfections that make it impossible for banks to raise new capital.
We show that the shock increases the shadow value of bank capital and consequently reduces optimal capital requirements. We also show that if capital requirements are kept unchanged, the reduction in the supply of bank capital will be accommodated by a signi…cant reduction in bank lending and aggregate investment. However, the corresponding reduction in social welfare is mitigated by the fact that the operating banks will be safer than in the optimal regulation.
The literature on the procyclical e¤ects of risk-sensitive bank capital regulation has grown in recent years. The closest paper is Repullo and Suarez (2013) . In contrast with our static setup, they consider a dynamic model of relationship lending in which banks are unable to access the equity markets every period and the business cycle is modeled as a two-state Markov process that determines the loans'probabilities of default. They compare the performance of several capital regulation regimes, including one that maximizes social welfare. Their analysis is complicated by the fact that to protect their future lending capacity, banks will in general choose to have capital in excess of the minimum required by regulation.
They show that the risk-based requirements of Basel II are more procyclical than the ‡at requirements of the earlier Basel I regulation, but make banks safer. They also show that Basel II dominates Basel I in terms of social welfare except for low values of the social cost of bank failure. In contrast with our static model, in their dynamic model shocks to bank capital come from defaults of past loans. However, they do not have a cross-sectional distribution of bank risks, since all the loans granted in any period have the same probability of default.
Other related literature includes the early contributions of Daníelsson et al. (2001) and Gordy and Howells (2006) , and the more recent of Brunnermeier et al. (2009 ), Hanson, Kashyap, and Stein (2011 ), and Shleifer and Vishny (2010 , which note the potential importance of the procyclical e¤ects of risk-sensitive capital requirements and elaborate on the pros and cons of the various policy options for their correction.
The procyclicality problem received considerable attention in statements of the G-20
following the failure of Lehman Brothers. 2 The 2010 agreement of the Basel Committee (BCBS, 2010a), known as Basel III, refers to the following four key objectives: dampen any excess cyclically of the minimum capital requirement, promote more forward looking provisions, conserve capital to build bu¤ers that can be used in stress, and achieve the broader macroprudential goal of protecting the banking sector from periods of excess credit growth.
However, there is essentially nothing in Basel III on the …rst two objectives. 3 The third objective gave rise to the capital conservation bu¤er, and the fourth to the countercyclical capital bu¤er. While the capital conservation bu¤er is a reasonable proposal in the spirit of prompt corrective action provisions of the 1992 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDCIA), Repullo and Saurina (2012) argue that the proposed capital conservation bu¤er (see BCBS, 2010b) might actually exacerbate the procyclical e¤ects of 2 For example, in the November 2008 Washington Summit the G-20 instructed the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), and the Basel Committee "to develop recommendations to mitigate procyclicality, including the review of how valuation and leverage, bank capital, executive compensation, and provisioning practices may exacerbate cyclical trends."
3 To mitigate the excess cyclicality of the minimum capital requirement, Repullo, Saurina, and Trucharte (2011) propose to use a business cycle multiplier that would be an increasing function of GDP growth. the regulation, because the variable on which it is based (the credit-to-GDP gap) tends to be negatively correlated with GDP growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and characterizes the equilibrium in the absence of regulation. Section 3 introduces a social cost of bank failure and characterizes the optimal bank capital regulation. Section 4 provides a numerical illustration of the previous results. Section 5 discusses the e¤ects of a negative shock to the aggregate supply of bank capital under optimally adjusted and …xed capital requirements. Section 6 concludes. Appendix A shows that the results are robust to the introduction of an elastic aggregate supply of bank capital, and Appendix B contains the proofs of the analytical results.
The Model
Consider an economy with two dates (t = 0; 1); a continuum of risk-neutral banks described by their (observable) type 2 [0; 1], and a large set of risk-neutral investors that can fund the banks with uninsured deposits and outside equity capital. The distribution of potential bank types is assumed to be uniform in the interval [0; 1].
At t = 0 a bank of type can invest one unit of funds in a risky asset that yields a stochastic payo¤ at t = 1 given by
with probability p; with probability 1 p;
where a > 1 is a parameter that characterizes the pro…tability of the banks' investments, and p 2 [0; 1] is a parameter privately chosen by the bank at t = 0; which is the source of the (risk-shifting) moral hazard problem. 4 Notice that higher risk (lower p) is associated with a higher success payo¤.
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The functional form in (1) implies
This means that in the absence of moral hazard, a bank of type would choose p = ; which is the (…rst-best) probability of success that maximizes the bank's expected payo¤. For this reason, we will refer to banks with high (low) 's as safer (riskier) banks.
Banks may fund their investment by raising funds from uninsured depositors, that require an expected return that is normalized to 0; and from outside equity investors, that require an expected (excess) return 0: 6 We assume that there is a …xed aggregate supply of bank capital K; so the cost of capital will be endogenously determined.
In the absence of regulation, banks choose at t = 0 the amount of capital k 2 [0; 1] and deposits 1 k; as well the (gross) interest rate b o¤ered to the depositors and the ownership share 2 [0; 1] o¤ered to the outside shareholders, so an ownership share 1 is retained by the inside shareholders who manage the bank.
For a given cost of capital ; the optimal …nancing contract for a bank of type is a solution (k( ; ); b( ; ); ( ; ); p( ; )) to the following problem
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint
the depositors'participation constraint
and the outside shareholders'participation constraint
The objective function in (2) is the expected payo¤ of the inside shareholders, which equals their ownership share 1 multiplied by the probability of success p and by the di¤erence between the success return a(2 p) and the promised debt repayment b(1 k):
6 Notice that the maximum expected payo¤ of the investment of a bank of type is [a(2 )] = a 2 : The assumption a > 1 implies that in the absence of moral hazard banks with types a 1=2 would be able to fund their investments with deposits.
The incentive compatibility constraint (3) characterizes the bank's choice of p given the repayment b( ; )(1 k( ; )): The depositors' and the outside shareholders' participation constraints (4) and (5) ensure that they get the required expected return on their investments in the bank.
The following result characterizes the banks'capital and risk decisions for a given cost of capital .
Proposition 1
The capital and risk decisions of a bank of type when the cost of capital is 0 are
Only banks with types ( ); where
will operate.
The level of capital k( ; ) chosen by the banks is decreasing in their type (so safer banks have less capital) and in the cost of bank capital (so banks economize on capital when it becomes more expensive). In the limit case = 0; where the cost of bank capital equals the expected return required by depositors, we have k( ; 0) = 1; that is all banks will be 100% equity …nanced. The intuition for this result is straightforward. Bank capital helps to ameliorate the risk-shifting problem but it is in general more expensive than deposits, except in the limit case = 0 where there is no trade-o¤, and hence banks choose to be fully funded with equity.
The probability of success p( ; ) chosen by the banks is increasing in their type (so banks with high 's are indeed safer) and is decreasing in the cost of bank capital (so when banks economize on capital they become riskier). In the limit case = 0; where banks are 100% equity …nanced, we have p( ; 0) = ; which is the …rst-best probability of success.
The depositors'participation constraint (4) implies
which means that the e¤ects of and on the deposit rate b( ; ) have the opposite sign of their e¤ects on the probability of success p( ; ): In other words, safer banks either by nature (high ) or by choice (low ) pay lower deposit rates.
Finally, the type ( ) of the marginal bank (whose inside shareholders are indi¤erent between operating and not operating it) is increasing in the cost of bank capital : Hence an increase in reduces the set of banks that operate in the economy (of types 2 [ ( ); 1]) and also reduces the demand for capital of the operating banks. This means that the aggregate demand for bank capital
will be decreasing in the cost of capital :
The equilibrium cost of bank capital b is found by equating the aggregate demand for bank capital K( ) to the …xed supply K, that is by solving the equation
We are going to assume that the aggregate supply of bank capital K is such that b > 0:
By Proposition 1 this requires
which may be rewritten as
Since each operating bank invests a unit of funds, aggregate investment in this economy is equal to the mass of banks that operate in equilibrium, that is
where b = ( b ): Given that K( ) is decreasing and ( ) is increasing in ; it follows that a contraction in the supply of bank capital K will increase the equilibrium cost of bank capital b and reduce aggregate investment b I in the economy.
An interesting feature of this model, which contrasts with many models in the banking literature, is that banks will voluntarily choose to have a positive level of capital k( ; ) > 0:
There are two reasons for this result. First, having capital k reduces the required amount of deposits 1 k; which ameliorates the risk-shifting problem generated by debt …nance.
Second, this e¤ect reduces the interest rate b of uninsured deposits, and hence the face value b(1 k) of the debt to be repaid at t = 1; which further ameliorates the risk-shifting problem.
Optimal Bank Capital Regulation
To motivate bank capital regulation we are going to consider that bank failures entail a social cost. A convenient parameterization is to assume that for a bank of type this cost is equal to ca ; that is a proportion c > 0 of the success payo¤ of the bank's investment under the …rst-best probability of success p = , which is a(2 p) = a . Since this cost is not internalized by the banks, their choice of capital and risk will be socially ine¢ cient.
To deal with this externality, we introduce a risk-neutral regulator whose objective function is to maximize social welfare. The regulator faces the same informational constraints as the market, in particular the inability to directly control banks'risk-taking, so it resorts to using capital requirements to indirectly in ‡uence banks' choice of risk. To get interior solutions to the optimal capital requirements, we assume that parameter c satis…es
In our risk-neutral economy, social welfare is measured by the sum of the expected payo¤s of depositors and bank (inside and outside) shareholders, minus the expected social cost associated with bank failures. But since depositors receive the required return on their contribution to banks'…nancing, we can ignore their payo¤ in the welfare calculations.
The optimal capital requirements are obtained as a solution (k ( ); b ( ); p ( ); ) to the following problem
and the capital availability constraint
The integrand of the regulator's objective function (13) has two components: The …rst one is the banks'expected pro…ts and the second one, with negative sign, is the expected social cost of bank failure. The integral ranges from (the type of the riskiest bank that is allowed to operate) to 1 (the type of the safest bank). In choosing the optimal capital requirement k ( ) for each type of bank , the regulator takes into account that the bank will be optimally setting the deposit rate b ( ) to raise the required deposits 1 k ( ). This explains the incentive compatibility constraint (14) and the depositors'participation constraint (15), which are identical to the constraints (3) and (4) in the case of the unregulated bank. The regulator also takes into account the overall availability of bank capital in constraint (16).
Since the …rst-order condition that characterizes the solution to the incentive compatibility constraint (14) is
the objective function may be written as
The following result characterizes the optimal capital requirements.
Proposition 2 If c satis…es condition (12), the optimal capital requirements and corresponding risk decisions for a bank of type are
where is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the capital availability constraint (16).
The values of and the type of the marginal bank are obtained as the unique solution to the system formed by the capital availability constraint (16) and the condition
that the contribution of the marginal bank to social welfare be zero, and satisfy
The Lagrange multiplier is the shadow value of bank capital, that is the increase in social welfare resulting from a marginal increase in the aggregate supply of bank capital. As in Kashyap and Stein (2004) , the optimal capital requirements k ( ) are decreasing in .
Proposition 2 shows that the Lagrange multiplier and the type of the marginal bank are obtained by solving a system of two equations: The capital availability constraint (16) and the condition (21) that the contribution of the marginal bank to social welfare be zero. The …rst condition implies a downward sloping relationship between and : If bank capital becomes more valuable, then according to (19) the regulator will lower capital requirements so more banks will be allowed to operate and the type of the marginal bank will be lower.
The second condition implies an upward sloping relationship between and : If bank capital becomes more valuable, then the marginal bank must be of a higher type. Hence there is (at most) a unique intersection between the two functions that determines and :
The result (22) implies that the optimal capital requirements k ( ) set by the regulator are decreasing in the bank's type (so safer banks are required to have less capital). The corresponding probabilities of success p ( ) chosen by the banks are increasing in their type (so banks with high 's are indeed safer).
The proof of Proposition 2 shows that when the parameter c that characterizes the social cost of bank failure reaches the upper bound in (12), the Lagrange multiplier satis…es
(1 + c)=(2 1) = 1; in which case (19) and (20) become k ( ) = 1 (100% capital requirements) and p ( ) = (the …rst-best probability of success). The intuition for this result is clear. When the social cost of bank failure is su¢ ciently large, the primary objective of the regulator becomes to minimize the probability of bank failure, which obtains when banks are solely …nanced with equity.
Under the optimal regulation there will be a corresponding equilibrium cost of bank capital determined by the condition that the inside shareholders of the marginal bank of type must be indi¤erent between operating and not operating it. Assuming that banks do not want to have more capital than the one required by regulation (this will be shown to be the case in Proposition 3 below), the equilibrium condition in the market for bank capital will coincide with the capital availability constraint (16) in the regulator's problem, so the type of the marginal bank will be : Hence the equilibrium cost of bank capital under the optimal regulation will be determined by the condition
where the …rst term in this expression is the expected pro…ts of the marginal bank (using the …rst-order condition (17)), and the second is the required compensation of the outside shareholders.
The following result compares the equilibrium with and without capital regulation.
Proposition 3 When the social cost of bank failure is zero the equilibrium allocation in the absence of regulation is optimal. When c > 0 we have
Moreover, banks do not want to have more capital than k ( ).
There are three separate results in Proposition 3. The …rst one states that when there are no externalities associated with bank failures, the unregulated market equilibrium is e¢ cient, with banks privately choosing the optimal amount of capital. 8 In this case we have = 1 + b ; so the shadow value of bank capital equals the equilibrium private cost of bank capital.
The second result states that when bank failures entail a social cost, the optimal regulation requires banks to have more capital than they would in the unregulated market equilibrium, so they become safer. But there is a trade-o¤: With an exogenously given supply of bank capital fewer banks will be operating, and hence aggregate investment will fall.
The third result relates to the equilibrium cost of bank capital under the optimal regulation: For this value of the cost of capital, banks would not want to have more capital than the level required by the regulator. This implies that the optimal regulation may be implemented as a risk-based schedule of minimum capital requirements.
A Numerical Illustration
To illustrate our previous results, consider a numerical example in which we set the parameter that characterizes the pro…tability of the banks' investments a = 5; and suppose that the aggregate supply of bank capital K is such that the equilibrium cost of bank capital in the absence of regulation is b = 12:5%: 
Thus the safest bank (of type = 1) will choose a level of capital k(1; b ) = 10% and a probability of success p(1; b ) = 90%: Riskier banks (with < 1) will have more capital, but this will be insu¢ cient to compensate the worsening of the moral hazard problem, and they will choose lower probabilities of success. Also by Proposition 1, the type of the marginal bank that is indi¤erent between operating and not operating will be b = ( b ) = 4:5 1=2 = 0:471: Finally, the required aggregate supply of bank capital is given by
To compute the optimal capital requirements we set the social cost of bank failure c = 0:2:
Solving equations (16) and (21) gives a shadow value of bank capital = 1:211 and a marginal bank type = 0:538: Hence by Proposition 2 the optimal capital requirements and the corresponding risk decisions for a bank of type are
Thus the safest bank (of type = 1) will face a capital requirement k (1) = 28:2% and will choose a probability of success p (1) = 92:2%: Note that, as stated in Proposition 3, k ( ) > k( ; b ) and p ( ) > p( ; b ); so banks will have more capital and will be safer than in the absence of regulation. However, given that there is a …xed aggregate supply of bank capital, requiring banks to have more capital will necessarily reduce the set of banks that operate. In particular, the type of the marginal bank will increase from b = 0:471 to = 0:538: Therefore aggregate investment will fall by 12:6% from b I = 1 b = 0:529 to I = 1 = 0:462: Finally, the equilibrium cost of capital will jump from b = 12:5% to = 55:3%; re ‡ecting the increase in the demand for bank capital generated by the optimal regulation.
To illustrate the result, Figure 1 plots the functions k( ; b ) and k ( ) in (24) and (26). To facilitate the comparison with the standard capital charge curves à la Basel II, the variable in the horizontal axis is 1 ; which is a measure of banks'risk. The two functions have a similar shape, with the gap between k( ; b ) and k ( ) becoming smaller when tends to zero. This …gure depicts the equilibrium capital decisions in the absence of regulation and the optimal capital requirements for the di¤erent types of banks, with the corresponding levels of aggregate investment in the horizontal axis. The sum of the areas of regions A and B and the sum of the areas of regions B and C equals the aggregate supply of bank capital.
equals the aggregate supply of bank capital K, and similarly the integral below the curve k ( ) between 0 and I also equals K: This means that the area of region A must be equal to the area of region C:
Like in the case of risk-sensitive capital requirements à la Basel II, the optimal capital requirements k ( ) are increasing in the measure of banks'risk, 1 . However, our capital requirements are not based on a purely statistical value-at-risk calculation, with an arbitrary con…dence level, but follow from the maximization of the appropriate social welfare function.
Cyclical Adjustment of Capital Requirements
This section considers the e¤ect of a negative shock to the aggregate supply of bank capital under optimally adjusted and …xed capital requirements.
Speci…cally, suppose that the supply of bank capital goes down from K 0 to K 1 : Following the discussion after Proposition 2, we …rst derive the e¤ect of the shock on the values the Lagrange multiplier and the type of the marginal bank. A reduction in the aggregate supply of bank capital produces an upward shift in the downward sloping relationship between and implied by the capital availability constraint (16). Since the relationship between and implied by the condition (21) on the zero contribution of the marginal bank to social welfare is upward sloping, the e¤ect of the shock will be to increase the value of the Lagrange multiplier ; re ‡ecting the higher shadow value of bank capital, and the value of the type of the marginal bank, re ‡ecting the need to shrink the set of banks that will be allowed to operate in order to economize on scarce bank capital.
By Proposition 2, the increase in will reduce the optimal capital requirements k ( ) and the probability of success p ( ) of the operating banks. The intuition for these results is clear: The optimal way to accommodate the shock in the aggregate supply of bank capital is to reduce capital requirements in order to avoid the reduction in aggregate investment that otherwise would obtain. The reduction in bank capital in turn explains the increase in the probability of failure of the operating banks. Finally, the increase in the type of the marginal bank means that aggregate investment will fall, but by less than without the reduction in capital requirements.
We may illustrate these results using our previous numerical example. In particular, suppose that the aggregate supply of bank capital goes down by 25% from K 0 = 0:260 (the value chosen in Section 4 to get an equilibrium cost of bank capital in the absence of regulation b = 12:5%) to K 1 = 0:195: Solving equations (16) and (21) 
Comparing these results with (26) and (27), it follows that the reduction in capital requirements will be very signi…cant, but the e¤ect on bank risk will be relatively small. For example, the capital requirement for the safest bank (of type = 1) will be reduced from k 0 (1) = 28:2% to k 1 (1) = 6:8%; while the corresponding probability of success will go down from p 0 (1) = 92:2% to p 1 (1) = 89:6%: The marginal bank will now be of type 1 = 0:544;
which means that aggregate investment will only fall by 1:3% from I 0 = 1 0 = 0:462 to I 1 = 1 1 = 0:456: Finally, using (23) we conclude that the equilibrium cost of capital will increase from 0 = 55:3% to 1 = 64:3%; re ‡ecting the negative shock in the aggregate supply of bank capital which is not fully compensated by the reduction in capital requirements. Figure 2 plots the optimal capital requirements before and after the shock in the aggregate supply of bank capital, as well as the critical values I 0 = 1 0 and I 1 = 1 1 beyond which banks will not be operating, respectively, before and after the shock. As noted above, the adjustment is made by reducing the set of operating banks and by lowering the capital requirements for the banks that remain in operation. In the numerical example, the second element of the adjustment is much more important than the …rst.
We next consider what happens under a …xed capital requirements regime in which capital requirements are not optimally adjusted following the shock in the aggregate supply of bank capital, but kept …xed at k 0 ( ): In this case, the reduction in the supply of bank capital can only be accommodated by a signi…cant reduction in the set of operating banks. Speci…cally, the type e 1 of the marginal bank is found by solving the equation
which gives e 1 = 0:624: This implies that aggregate investment will fall by 18:6% from I 0 = 1 0 = 0:462 to e I 1 = 1 e 1 = 0:376: Finally, to ensure that the inside shareholders of Figure 2 . Optimal capital requirements before and after the shock to the supply of bank capital This …gure depicts the optimal capital requirements for the di¤erent types of banks before and after the negative shock to the aggregate supply of bank capital, with the corresponding levels of aggregate investment in the horizontal axis.
the marginal bank of type e 1 will be indi¤erent between operating and not operating it, the equilibrium cost of capital will jump from 0 = 55:3% to e 1 = 129:5%: Figure 3 shows the di¤erence in the adjustment to the shock in the aggregate supply of bank capital when capital requirements are reduced from k 0 ( ) to k 1 ( ) and when they are kept …xed at k 0 ( ): In the …rst case, aggregate investment goes down to I 1 = 1 1 = 0:456; while in the second it goes down to e I 1 = 1 e 1 = 0:376; re ‡ecting the fact that 100% of the reduction in the demand for bank capital is achieved by increasing the cost of capital and consequently reducing the set of operating banks. As before, the integral below the curve k 1 ( ) between 0 and I 1 equals the aggregate supply of bank capital K 1 , and similarly the integral below the curve k 0 ( ) between 0 and e I 1 also equals K 1 : This means that the area of region A must be equal to the area of region C: This clearly illustrates the di¤erence in the two adjustment mechanisms: Under the optimal regulation the smaller supply of bank capital is distributed among a larger set of banks, so aggregate investment only falls to I 1 ; while under …xed capital requirements the supply of bank capital is allocated to a smaller set of banks, so aggregate investment falls to e I 1 < I 1 : Table 1 summarizes the e¤ects of a 25% reduction in the aggregate supply of bank capital on the equilibrium cost of bank capital, aggregate investment, and social welfare in the optimal and the …xed capital requirements regimes. Under the optimal regulation the greater part of the adjustment to the new environment is achieved by lowering capital requirements, with only a relatively small increase in the cost of bank capital (which goes from 0 = 55:3% to 1 = 64:3%) and a reduction of only 1:3% in aggregate investment (from I 0 = 0:462 to I 1 = 0:456). Social welfare falls by a greater extent (by 7:3% from W 0 = 1:101
to W 1 = 1:021) because the reduction in capital requirements makes banks riskier, and hence their expected pro…ts go down and the expected social cost of bank failure goes up.
In contrast, when capital requirements remain unchanged all the adjustment to the new environment is achieved by increasing the cost of bank capital (which goes from 0 = 55:3%
to e 1 = 129:5%), so there is a very signi…cant reduction in aggregate investment (of 18:6% from I 0 = 0:462 to e I 1 = 0:376). Although the operating banks are safer than in the optimal regulation, the reduction in investment leads to a greater fall in social welfare (of 9:1% from W 0 = 1:101 to f W 1 = 1:001). The optimal adjustment of capital requirements yields an increase of 2:0% in social welfare (from f W 1 = 1:001 to W 1 = 1:021). This di¤erence may be decomposed as follows:
where the …rst term in the last expression is the welfare gain due to the higher investment, the second is the welfare loss due to fact that operating banks choose riskier (and hence less e¢ cient) investments, and the third is the welfare loss due to the higher probability of bank failures. The numerical values of the three terms are Thus there is an increase in social welfare of 8:7% associated with the higher investment, which is almost compensated by a decrease of 6:0% due to the reduction in the pro…tability of the operating banks, and a decrease of 0:7% due to the higher social cost of bank failures.
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Summing up, our numerical results illustrate the qualitative results of our model, namely that a negative shock to the aggregate supply of bank capital should be partially accommodated by a reduction in capital requirements. Otherwise, banks would be safer but there would be an excessive reduction in the level of economic activity, which would lead to a greater reduction in social welfare.
Concluding Remarks
This paper presents a simple model of optimal bank capital regulation that provides a rationale for the cyclical adjustment of risk-sensitive capital requirements. Speci…cally, capital requirements should be lowered in situations where bank capital is scarce such as economic 10 It should be noted that the di¤erence in welfare terms between adjusting and not adjusting the capital requirements is relatively small. This is explained by the fact that we are taking as reference an initial optimal regulation, so lim K1!K0 (W 1 f W 1 ) = 0: I am grateful to Douglas Gale for pointing this out.
downturns. The trade-o¤ behind the result is explained by Kashyap and Stein (2004) in the following terms: "When banks'lending activities are more severely constrained it is socially desirable to accept a higher probability of bank default (...) It cannot make sense for bank lending to bear the entire brunt of the adjustment, while the expected costs of defaults remain constant."
The results provide a balanced assessment of the costs and bene…ts of adjusting capital requirements to the state of the business cycle. In particular, from a social welfare perspective it is incorrect either to focus exclusively on the potential credit crunch e¤ects of the regulation, if capital requirements are not lowered in recessions, or to focus exclusively on the greater likelihood of bank failures, if they are. Thus, from a practical point of view, it seems important to integrate a macroprudential with a microprudential perspective. In this regard, the results of the paper are very much in line with those in Repullo and Suarez (2012) , who provide "a call for caution against the simple claim that if regulation induces cyclicality it needs to be radically adjusted: the adjustment is not a free lunch."
The results also provide a rationale for the recapitalization of banks with public funds following a negative shock to their capital, as was done in the Capital Purchase Program of the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). If the shadow value of bank capital after the shock is greater than the social cost of public funds, such intervention would be welfare improving.
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In contrast with the Basel II regulation, which is based on the value-at-risk criterion that capital must cover losses with a certain con…dence level, our model focusses on welfare optimal capital requirements. However, using the results in the proof of Proposition 1, we could easily compute the capital requirements for a con…dence level 2 (0; 1), 12 which would be k ( ) = minfmaxf1 2a ( ); 0g; 1g:
Providing a rationale for a cyclical adjustment of capital requirements would be more com-11 I am grateful to Diana Hancock for pointing this out.
plicated in this setup because the safest banks will want to have more capital than the one prescribed by regulation. But the same logic would apply here: Capital requirements designed for good times would be expected to be too high in bad times, so the con…dence level targeted by the regulator should be adjusted according to the state of the business cycle.
We would like to conclude with two caveats. First, the arrival of a recession may be accompanied by other changes in the model such as reducing the size of the banks'investment opportunities, which was normalized to one, or its pro…tability, captured by parameter a; or shifting to the left the distribution of bank types. The …rst e¤ect would reduce the demand for capital, and hence the need for an adjustment of capital requirements, the second would exacerbate the banks'risk-shifting incentives, and hence called for higher rather than lower capital requirements, and the third e¤ect would go in the same direction, since it would reduce the left-hand side of the capital availability constraint (16).
The second caveat is that our setup ignores feedback e¤ects from the level of investment and economic activity to the pro…tability of the banks' investments. One could introduce these e¤ects by making the pro…tability parameter a an increasing (and possibly concave) function of the level of aggregate investment I: This would capture demand externalities or technological complementarities similar to those studies in endogenous growth theory.
Although the analysis of optimal regulation would be more complicated, it is clear that such e¤ects would strengthen the rationale for the cyclical adjustment of capital requirements.
and p( ; k) is given by (33). Di¤erentiating the integrand with respect to k gives a …rst-order condition whose solution is k ( ) in (19), and substituting this result into (33) and rearranging gives p ( ) in (20) . Di¤erentiating objective function with respect to gives the …rst-order condition
And di¤erentiating objective function with respect to gives the …rst-order condition
These two conditions, together with the capital availability constraint (31) Therefore the optimal response to the negative shock in the aggregate supply of bank capital is to lower capital requirements. The marginal bank is of type 0 = 0:572 before the shock and of type 1 = 0:574 after the shock, so aggregate investment will fall by 0:4% from I 0 = 1 0 = 0:428 to I 1 = 1 1 = 0:426: As before, social welfare falls by 6:3% from W 0 = 1:155
to W 1 = 1:082. But if the capital requirements are not optimally adjusted after the shock, but kept …xed at k 0 ( ); aggregate investment will fall by 9:5% to e I 1 = 1 e 1 = 0:387; and social welfare will fall by 7:1% to f W 1 = 1:074: As in the case of the model with an inelastic supply of bank capital, the optimal adjustment of capital requirements yields an increase of only 0:8% in social welfare (from f W 1 = 1:074 to W 1 = 1:082); because the welfare gain due to the higher investment is almost compensated by the fact that the operating banks are less pro…table and more likely to fail.
B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 The …rst-order condition that characterizes the solution to the bank's incentive compatibility constraint (3) is
Substituting the depositors' participation constraint pb = 1 into this expression gives a quadratic equation whose solution is
where we have chosen the solution with the highest p, which is closest to the …rst-best p = and hence the one preferred by the bank.
To derive the optimal choice of capital, substitute the outside shareholders'participation constraint (5) and the …rst-order condition (32) into the bank's objective function (2) to get
Substituting (33) into this expression and di¤erentiating with respect to k gives the …rst-
Solving for k in this condition gives k( ; ) in (6), and substituting this result into (33) and rearranging gives p( ; ) in (7).
Finally, substituting p( ; ) and k( ; ) into (34) gives
which simpli…es to
Hence the expected payo¤ of the inside shareholders will be nonnegative for ( ); where ( ) is given by (8).
Proof of Proposition 2 Following the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 1, we can solve the …rst-order condition that characterizes the solution to the bank's incentive compatibility constraint (14) together with the depositors'participation constraint (15) to get a quadratic equation in p whose solution is (33). Then we can write the regulator's problem as
where denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the capital availability constraint (16). Di¤erentiating the integrand with respect to k gives the …rst-order condition
Solving for k in this condition gives k ( ) in (19), and substituting this result into (33) and
Di¤erentiating the regulator's objective function with respect to gives the …rst-order condition
which states that the contribution to social welfare of the marginal bank of type is zero.
The values of the Lagrange multiplier and the type of the marginal bank are found by solving (35) together with the capital availability constraint
To show that these two equations have at most a unique solution it su¢ ces to show that
so the relationship between and implicit in (35) is increasing, and that @G( ; ) @ < 0 and @G( ; ) @ < 0; so the relationship between and implicit in (36) is decreasing. The latter results are immediate from (36) and the expression (19) for k ( ); since @G( ; ) @ = k ( ) < 0 and @G( ; ) @ = Z 1 @k ( )
Next di¤erentiating (35) with respect to and using the expression (20) for p ( ); equation (35), and the expression (19) for k ( ) gives
Finally, di¤erentiating (35) with respect to and using the expressions (20) for p ( ) and (19) for k ( ) gives
(1 + c) (2 1) 2 + 2 a ( )
The upper bound in (12) for c is derived as follows. Suppose that the Lagrange multiplier satis…es (1 + c)=(2 1) = 1; in which case (19) and (20) become k ( ) = 1 and p ( ) = :
For any constant k (which we are going to set at k = 1) the capital availability constraint Di¤erentiating with respect to k the regulator's objective function evaluated at k = 1 gives
where we have used the fact that
Starting from the corner k = 1; a reduction in k will increase social welfare if
which gives condition (12) and implies that the Lagrange multiplier satis…es (22).
Proof of Proposition 3
When the social cost of bank failure c = 0 it is immediate to check that the conditions F ( ; ) = 0 and G( ; ) = 0 de…ned in (35) and (36) are satis…ed for = b and = 1 + b : Hence comparing (6) and (7) with (19) and (20) Hence an increase in c produces an upward shift the relationship between and implicit in both (35) and (36) (putting in the horizontal axis), which implies d =dc > 0 (and an ambiguous e¤ect on ). Since for c = 0 we have = b ; this implies I = 1 < 1 b = b I for c > 0; so aggregate investment will be lower under the optimal regulation.
Next using the condition that determines the equilibrium cost of capital in the absence of regulation (10) and the capital availability constraint (16) we have
Using the result > b we have
But by (6) and (19) so it must be the case that k( ; b ) < k ( ) for all 2 [ ; 1]; which proves that the optimal regulation requires banks to have more capital than they would in the absence of regulation.
By (33) this in turn implies p( ; b ) < p ( ) for all 2 [ ; 1]; so banks are safer than in the absence of regulation.
Finally, to prove that the optimal capital requirements will be binding we …rst show that But the …rst-order condition in Proposition 2 that characterizes the optimal capital requirements k ( ) is 2ap( ; k) @p( ; k) @k + ca @p( ; k) @k = 0:
Using the fact that @p( ; k)=@k > 0 by (33) and the result < 1 + ; this implies 2ap( ; k) @p( ; k) @k = ca @p( ; k) @k + < 1 + ;
as required.
